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Abstract Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is
the computational study of economies modeled as evolving
systems of autonomous interacting agents. Thus, ACE is a
specialization of economics of the basic complex adaptive
systems paradigm. This study outlines the main objectives
and dening characteristics of the ACE methodology and
discusses similarities and distinctions between ACE and
articial life research. Eight ACE research areas are identied,
and a number of publications in each area are highlighted for
concrete illustration. Open questions and directions for future
ACE research are also considered. The study concludes with
a discussion of the potential benets associated with ACE
modeling, as well as some potential difculties.
1 Introduction
Decentralized market economies are complex adaptive systems, consisting of large
numbers of adaptive agents involved in parallel local interactions. These local inter-
actions give rise to macroeconomic regularities such as shared market protocols and
behavioral norms that in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions. The
result is a complicated dynamic system of recurrent causal chains connecting individual
behaviors, interaction networks, and social welfare outcomes.
This intricate two-way feedback between microstructure and macrostructure has
been recognized within economics for a very long time [40, 71, 83, 86]. Neverthe-
less, for much of this time economists have lacked the means to model this feedback
quantitatively in its full dynamic complexity. The most salient characteristic of tra-
ditional quantitative economic models supported by microfoundations has been their
top-down construction. Heavy reliance is placed on extraneous coordination devices
such as xed decision rules, common knowledge assumptions, representative agents,
and imposed market equilibrium constraints. Face-to-face personal interactions typi-
cally play no role or appear in the form of tightly constrained game interactions. In
short, agents in these models have had little room to breathe.
Slowly but surely, however, advances in modeling tools have been enlarging the
possibility set for economists [8, 14, 25, 32, 41, 54, 82, 110]. Researchers can now
quantitatively model a wide variety of complex phenomena associated with decentral-
ized market economies, such as inductive learning, imperfect competition, endogenous
trade network formation, and the open-ended coevolution of individual behaviors and
economic institutions.
One branch of this work has come to be known as agent-based computational eco-
nomics (ACE), the computational study of economies modeled as evolving systems of
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autonomous interacting agents.1 ACE researchers rely on computational laboratories2 to
study the evolution of decentralized market economies under controlled experimental
conditions. Two basic concerns drive this study. One concern is descriptive, focus-
ing on the constructive explanation of emergent global behavior. Why have particular
global regularities evolved and persisted in real-world decentralized market economies,
despite the absence of top-down planning and control? How, specically, have these
global regularities been generated from the bottom up, through the repeated local in-
teractions of autonomous interacting agents? And why these particular regularities and
not others? The second concern is normative, focusing on mechanism design. Given a
particular economic entity, whether existing or simply envisioned, what are the implica-
tions of that entity for the performance of the economy as a whole? For example, how
might a particular market protocol or government regulation affect economic efciency?
As in a culture-dish laboratory experiment, the ACE modeler starts by constructing an
economy with an initial population of agents. These agents can include both economic
agents (e.g., traders, nancial institutions, etc.) and agents representing various other
social and environmental phenomena (e.g., government, land, weather, etc.). The ACE
modeler species the initial state of the economy by specifying the initial attributes of the
agents. The initial attributes of an agent might include type characteristics, internalized
behavioral norms, internal modes of behavior (including modes of communication and
learning), and internally stored information about itself and other agents. The economy
then evolves over time without further intervention from the modeler. All events that
subsequently occur must arise from the historical timeline of agent–agent interactions.
No extraneous coordination devices are permitted. For example, no resort can be
made to the ofine determination and imposition of market-clearing prices through
xed point calculations.
This culture-dish methodology is also the methodology of articial life (ALife) [107].
ACE and ALife researchers share a desire to demonstrate constructively how global
regularities might arise from the bottom up, through the repeated local interactions of
autonomous agents. Both sets of researchers use computational models as descriptive
tools for understanding existing phenomena and as normative tools for the design
and testing of alternative possibilities; and both sets of researchers share a desire to
develop coherent theories that are comprehensive in scope rather than fractured along
outmoded disciplinary boundary lines.
On the other hand, as stressed in [73], ALife researchers adopting the “strong” def-
inition of ALife view their models as syntheses of actual life in computers, machines,
and other alternative media. In contrast, until recently, ACE researchers have generally
viewed their models as representations of existing or potential economic processes
rather than as actual economic processes of intrinsic interest in their own right. As
will be claried in the next section, this sharp distinction between ACE modeling as
representation and (strong) ALife modeling as synthesis is beginning to blur. The re-
cent development of more powerful computational tools has led to increased efforts
to automate economic markets, particularly Internet markets. Automation means that
the market protocols permit price and quantity offers to be generated by computa-
tional agents (e.g., shopbots) as well as, or in place of, human agents. As a result, a
growing number of ACE researchers are now involved in the design and testing of au-
tomated markets and computational agents for direct practical application, particularly
on the Internet. Eventually, then, ACE researchers might need to address the same
ethical challenges already confronting the ALife community regarding the autonomous
proliferation and evolution of articial life forms [15].
1 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for extensive resources related to the ACE methodology.
2 The felicitous phrase “computational laboratories” is adopted from Dibble [27].
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Additional comparisons between ACE and ALife research will be made in Section 3
after a more detailed discussion of ACE research is given in Section 2. Before proceed-
ing, an important disclaimer is in order. The primary objective of this survey is modest
in scope: to introduce, motivate, and illustrate through concrete examples the poten-
tial usefulness of the ACE methodology by highlighting selected publications in eight
research areas that I believe represent interesting and substantial contributions. The
number of researchers now making use of the ACE methodology is large and growing,
however, and the number of issues addressed in this literature is expanding rapidly.
Inevitably, then, some important work will have been overlooked in this survey.3 More-
over, although efforts are made to identify and pay tribute to the earliest studies within
each covered research area, reader accessibility has been a primary concern. Conse-
quently, published versions of papers have generally been cited in favor of working
paper versions.4
2 Illustrative ACE Research Areas
Three special ACE journal issues have recently appeared that include a fairly diverse
sampling of current ACE research [97–99]. The topics addressed in these special issues
roughly divide into eight research areas: (a) learning and the embodied mind; (b) evolu-
tion of behavioral norms; (c) bottom-up modeling of market processes; (d) formation of
economic networks; (e) modeling of organizations; (f) design of computational agents
for automated markets; (g) parallel experiments with real and computational agents;
and (h) building ACE computational laboratories.5
These eight research areas will be used below to illustrate the potential usefulness
of the ACE methodology. Since all of the articles included in the special ACE journal
issues went through a careful review process in which readability and accessibility were
stressed, along with quality of content, a number of these articles will be highlighted
in this discussion.
2.1 Learning and the Embodied Mind
ACE researchers and other computationally oriented social scientists have used a broad
range of algorithms to represent the learning processes of computational agents. The
earliest application of genetic algorithm learning in economics appears to be by Miller
[67], and genetic algorithm learning continues to be used in many economic applica-
tions [23]. Chattoe [20] provides an excellent discussion of the use and misuse of genetic
algorithms, genetic programming, and other forms of evolutionary learning represen-
tations in the modeling of social processes. Additional types of learning algorithms
that have been used include action-based reinforcement learning algorithms [33, 88],
Q-learning [92, 104], classier systems [41], and various forms of learning algorithms
that have been adapted for use in automated markets [38, 91].
Many of these learning algorithms were originally developed with optimality ob-
jectives in mind, so caution must be used in applying them to social processes. For
computational models of automated economic processes, learning algorithms are ap-
propriately motivated on the basis of optimality criteria. In this case, the investigator
might reasonably employ a global learning scheme in which the current strategies of
the computational agents are jointly coevolved on the basis of some type of exoge-
3 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm for extensive annotated lists of pointers to the home pages of individual re-
searchers and research groups now active in ACE-related research. Suggestions for additional pointers are most welcome.
4 If a history of ACE ever comes to be written, one dif culty will be that many of the pioneering studies in the 1980s and early 1990s
either were published after long delays or remain as working papers.
5 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aapplic.htm for pointers to introductory resource pages for each of these ACE research
areas.
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nous tness criterion (e.g., market efciency). On the other hand, for computational
models of real-world economic processes with human participants, the learning algo-
rithms used for the computational agents will generally need to incorporate the salient
characteristics of actual human decision-making behavior if predictive power is to be
attained. In this case it might be more appropriate to permit local learning schemes
in which different “neighborhoods” of agents (e.g., rms within different industries)
separately coevolve their strategies on the basis of some type of endogenous tness
criterion (e.g., relative rm protability).
Gintis [37] echoes this caution. Departing from the traditional view of game theory as
a formal study of rational behavior among strategically interacting agents, Gintis instead
provides a problem-centered introduction to evolutionary game theory. He emphasizes
the need for a better modeling of agent behavior in view of the numerous anomalies
discovered in laboratory experiments between actual human-subject behaviors and the
behaviors predicted by traditional rational-agent theories. In particular, Gintis takes an
embodied-mind approach. He views games as strategic interaction problems embedded
in natural and social processes. As agents repeatedly grapple with these problems over
time, they ultimately evolve the ability to play these games effectively. Moreover, in
Gintis’ view, this evolution typically results less from cognitive processes than from
various forms of imitation, such as those underlying cultural transmission.
Aware of these concerns, ACE researchers are increasingly moving away from the
unconsidered adoption of off-the-shelf learning algorithms and toward a more sys-
tematic investigation of the performance of learning algorithms in various economic
decision contexts. For example, Dawid [23] undertakes a systematic study of dynamic
multi-agent economic models in which genetic algorithms are used to implement the
evolution of individual strategies. He shows that particular aspects of this implemen-
tation (e.g., the precise conguration of parameter settings) can strongly inuence the
set of potential long-run outcomes. This work has had a substantial impact on ACE
researchers, since genetic algorithms have been widely used by these researchers as
learning representations for their economic agents.
The learning study by Rust et al. [81] has also had a substantial impact on ACE
researchers. The authors report a comparative analysis of 30 computational trading
algorithms submitted to a double-auction tournament held at the Santa Fe Institute
between 1990 and 1991. The submitted algorithms ranged from simple rules of thumb
to sophisticated learning algorithms incorporating ideas from articial intelligence and
cognitive science. The winner of the tournament turned out to be one of the simplest
algorithms submitted, a “sniping” (last-minute bidding) strategy roughly describable as
follows: Wait while others do the negotiating, then jump in and steal the deal when
the bid and ask prices get sufciently close. It is interesting to note that sniping has
become an increasingly popular bidding strategy in Internet auctions such as eBay with
hard closing rules (xed end times), despite forceful attempts by auction managers to
discourage the practice. Indeed, there is now an Internet company eSnipe that, for a
fee, will automate this bidding strategy for any eBay participant [47].
Another learning study that has been highly inuential among ACE researchers and
economists in general is by Gode and Sunder [39], who report on continuous double-
auction experiments with computational agents. A continuous double auction is an
auction for standardized units of a real or nancial asset in which offers to buy and sell
units are posted and matched on a continuous basis. Continuous double auctions are a
common form of trading institution for many real-world commodity and nancial mar-
kets. Examples include the commodity trading pit of the Chicago Board of Trade and
the New York Stock Exchange [50]. Gode and Sunder nd that the allocative efciency
of their continuous double auction derives largely from its structure, independently of
learning effects. More precisely, they nd that market efciency levels close to 100%
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are attained even when their traders have “zero intelligence,” in the sense that they
submit random bids and asks that are subject only to a budget constraint.
A study by Vriend [103], which focuses on the importance of the level of learning for
computational agents, is also attracting quite a bit of attention. Vriend conducts ACE
experiments within the context of a standard Cournot oligopoly game: Namely, multiple
seller rms compete by individually choosing their quantity levels of production, which
in turn jointly determine the market price for the good produced. Two different genetic
algorithm specications for learning are considered: (a) individual level, in which each
rm learns exclusively on the basis of its own experiences; and (b) population level, in
which each rm learns from the experiences of other rms as well as its own. Vriend
nds that population learning systematically results in an aggregate output level close to
the socially desirable competitive level whereas individual learning does not. He traces
this difference to “spite effects”—choosing actions that hurt oneself but hurt others
even more. Spite effects operate under population learning to drive aggregate output
toward the competitive level, but spite effects are not operational under individual
learning.6
Other ACE researchers are attempting to calibrate their learning algorithms to empir-
ical decision-making data. One interesting example of this type of research is a study
by Marks [64], who takes up two important but immensely challenging questions. Do
the perceptions and information usages of market participants evolve during the course
of a market process? If so, how?
Marks rst formally sets out an analytical market framework within which these
questions can be rigorously posed and examined. The participants in this market are
permitted to evolve their information-processing capabilities over time. More precisely,
they are permitted to evolve the degree to which they partition their state spaces into
distinguishable regions for the purposes of determining state-conditioned actions. For
example, a crude partitioning may mean that a seller only pays attention to two possible
price actions of its rival sellers (low price, high price) whereas a ner partition may
mean that the seller pays attention to three possible price actions of its rival sellers (low
price, intermediate price, high price).
Marks then focuses on the particular case in which the only available state infor-
mation consists of the prices set by rivals. He considers two different measures for
the information loss accruing to a price-space partition of a given crudeness: num-
ber of perceived states, and Claude Shannon’s well-known entropy measure. He then
incorporates price-space partitioning into an ACE model of a retail coffee market. His-
torical data are used to calibrate this computational model to actual historical market
circumstances. The following specic question is posed: How much information do
actual coffee brand managers choose to use in their repeated interactions over time?
To investigate this question, Marks conducts a range of experiments under variously
specied partitioning structures for the price space: dichotomous partitioning in level;
dichotomous partitioning in rst differences; and terchotomous partitioning in levels.
Two historical scanner data sets from two different supermarket chains are separately
examined. Marks’ key nding, based on the range of tested partitioning models, is that
the dichotomous partitioning model in rst differences provides the most informative
t to the examined historical data. The implication is that actual coffee brand managers
appear to home in on one particular aspect of their rivals’ pricing strategies: namely,
did these rivals change their prices last period or not?
6 As a cautionary note, the particular nding by Vriend that social learning dominates individual learning in terms of achieving market
ef ciency seems special to his market, in which the seller  rms are all identically structured. In contrast, Nicolaisen et al. [69] nd
that a substantially higher level of market ef ciency is consistently obtained under individual reinforcement learning than under
genetic algorithm population-level learning in the context of a restructured electricity market in which the seller  rms (generators)
have differential costs.
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Another interesting development in ACE studies of learning is the use of human-
subject experimental data to calibrate the learning of computational agents. This work
is discussed in Subsection 2.7, below.
2.2 Evolution of Behavioral Norms
The concept of a “norm” has been dened in various ways by different researchers.
Axelrod [11] advances a behavioral denition, as follows: “A norm exists in a given
social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often
punished when seen not to be acting in this way” (p. 47). He justies this denition
on the grounds that it makes the existence of norms a matter of degree, which permits
one to study the growth and decay of norms as an evolutionary process. Using agent-
based computational experiments, he then demonstrates how mutual cooperation can
evolve among self-interested non-related agents through reciprocity with little or no
explicit forward-looking behavior on the part of the agents. This seminal work has been
extraordinarily inuential among economists and game theorists alike. In particular, it
has vastly enlarged the traditional scope of noncooperative game theory by encouraging
the consideration of bounded rationality and evolutionary dynamics.
Another researcher whose work on behavioral norms has profoundly inuenced
economists is Thomas Schelling. Working with familiar examples from everyday life,
and without the aid of sophisticated computational tools, Schelling [83] shows how
patterned social behavior can arise as the unintended consequence of repeated local
interactions among agents following simple behavioral rules. For example, he demon-
strates how segregation by race can arise through local chain reactions if some agents
prefer to avoid minority status by having at least half of their neighbors be of the same
race as themselves.
Building on the work by Schelling, Epstein and Axtell [32] use agent-based computa-
tional experiments to investigate how various collective behaviors might arise from the
interactions of agents following simple rules of behavior. In a subsequent study, Axtell
et al. [13] study the emergence and stability of equity norms in society. In particular,
using both analysis and computational experiments, they show how intrinsically mean-
ingless “tags” associated with agents can acquire social salience over time, such as when
tag-based classes emerge. This study has interesting connections with the work on tag-
mediated interactions by Holland and Riolo [42, 78], who show that introducing even
very simple tag-choice schemes in interacting-agent systems can dramatically change
the course of evolutionary outcomes. Another related study is by Arifovic and Eaton
[6], who study how computational agents learn to use tags (truthfully or deceptively)
to signal their types.
More recently, Epstein [31] uses an agent-based computational model to study an
important observed aspect of behavioral norm evolution: namely, that the amount of
time an individual devotes to thinking about a behavior tends to be inversely related
to the strength of the behavioral norms that relate to this behavior. In the limit, once
a norm is rmly entrenched in a society, individuals tend to conform their behavior to
the norm without explicit thought. Epstein’s innovative model permits agents to learn
how to behave (what norm to adopt), but it also permits agents to learn how much to
think about how to behave.
2.3 Bottom-Up Modeling of Market Processes
The self-organizing capabilities of specic types of market processes is now one of the
most active areas of ACE research. For example, articles included in the special ACE
issues [98, 99] investigate the following types of markets: nancial; electricity; labor;
retail; business-to-business; natural resource; entertainment; and automated Internet
exchange systems. To give the general avor of this research, an early inuential study
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by Robert Marks will rst be reviewed. This will be followed by a discussion of several
recent studies focusing on nancial markets and restructured electricity markets, two
of the most highly active and topical research areas for ACE market studies.
2.3.1 An Early Study by Marks
Robert Marks was one of the rst researchers to use an ACE framework to address the is-
sue of market self-organization. His research highlighted for economists—in compelling
constructive terms—the potential importance of history, interactions, and learning for
the determination of strategic market outcomes. Specically, in [63], Marks used an
ACE model of an oligopolistic market (i.e., a market with a small number of sellers) to
investigate how price-setting seller rms might successfully compete. His model made
use of a genetic algorithm to model his rms as boundedly rational inductive learners.
Specically, mutation and recombination operations were repeatedly applied to the
collection of pricing strategies in use by rms as a way of permitting the rms both to
experiment with new ideas (mutation) and to engage in social mimicry (recombination)
by adopting aspects of the strategies used by more protable rms.
One outcome observed by Marks in his experiments was the emergence of globally
optimal “joint maximization” pricing across rms without any explicit price collusion.
At the time, this type of bottom-up evolution-of-cooperation outcome was new to many
economists, since few had yet encountered the seminal work by Axelrod [10] on this
topic. Not surprisingly, then, Marks stressed this nding in his article. Nevertheless, in
retrospect, an equally interesting nding is that the evolution of cooperation across rms
was not assured. Rather, in many of the experimental runs, different congurations of
niche strategies emerged that were successful only against a particular collection of
competitors. Thus, rms were coevolving their strategies in an intricate dance of path-
dependent interactions. Chance mattered for the determination of the nal outcomes,
as did the behavioral quirks that individual rms evolved in response to their own
particular interaction histories. An important implication of this type of path-dependent
coevolution is that the “optimal” pricing strategy evolved by a rm in any one particular
run of a market experiment might in fact perform very poorly if simply inserted into
the pool of pricing strategies evolved in a different run of the same market experiment.
2.3.2 Financial Markets
Conventional models of nancial markets based on assumptions of rational choice
and market efciency are extremely elegant in form. Unfortunately, no single model
to date has proved capable of explaining the basic empirical features of real nancial
markets, including fat-tailed asset return distributions, high trading volumes, persistence
and clustering in asset return volatility, and cross-correlations between asset returns,
trading volume, and volatility.7
Due in great part to these well-known difculties, nancial markets have become
one of the most active research areas for ACE modelers. Indeed, ACE nancial market
models have been able to provide possible explanations for a variety of observed reg-
ularities in nancial data [34, 43, 60, 61]. Several of the earliest ACE nancial market
studies are surveyed in detail in LeBaron [56], including the highly inuential Santa Fe
articial stock market study by Arthur et al. [9]. The latter study develops a dynamic
theory of asset pricing based on heterogeneous stock market traders who update their
price expectations individually and inductively by means of classier systems [41]. Sev-
eral more recent studies are outlined below to give the avor of the current literature.
Tay and Linn [90] conjecture that better explanatory power might be obtained in
nancial models by allowing the agents to form their expectations in accordance with
7 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/sources.htm for extensive resources related to nancial markets.
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the way investors form their expectations in real life: namely, in fuzzy terms using
inductive reasoning. They argue that these features can be faithfully captured by a
genetic-fuzzy classier system, a modication of Holland’s basic classier system [41].
To test their claim, they modify the Santa Fe articial stock market model [9] by permit-
ting traders to form their expectations inductively using a genetic-fuzzy classier system
and by modifying the manner in which traders decide which prediction rules to rely
on when making demand decisions. They report experimental ndings that show that
the asset prices and returns generated by their model exhibit characteristics, including
measures of kurtosis, that are very similar to actual data.
LeBaron [57] is similarly interested in obtaining a better model t to empirically
observed regularities for nancial markets. He calibrates an agent-based computational
stock market model to aggregate macroeconomic and nancial data. All investors
use past performance to evaluate the performance of their trading rules, but different
investors have memories of different length. A genetic algorithm is used to coevolve the
collection of trading rules available to the agents. The model is calibrated to the growth
and variability of dividend payments in the United States. LeBaron is able to show that
the calibrated model generates return, volume, and volatility features remarkably similar
to those characterizing actual nancial time series data.
Foreign exchange markets have also proved to be extremely difcult to model with
any predictive power using conventional modeling approaches. Izumi and Ueda [45]
propose a new agent-based approach to the modeling of foreign exchange markets.
They use eld data (dealer interviews and questionnaires) to construct behavioral rules
governing agent interactions and learning in a multi-agent foreign exchange model.
The agents in their model compete with each other to develop methods for predicting
changes in future exchange rates, with tness measured by protability. The objective
of the authors is to provide a quantitative microfoundations explanation for empiri-
cally observed macroregularities in foreign exchange markets. They are able to show
that their model provides a possible explanation for the emergence of the following
three empirical features: peaked and fat-tailed rate change distributions; a negative
correlation between trading volume and exchange rate volatility; and a “contrary opin-
ions” phenomenon in which convergence of opinion causes a predicted event to fail
to materialize.
Chen and Yeh [21] argue that social learning in the form of imitation of strategies
is important in stock markets, along with individual learning, but that standard stock
market models do not include the mechanisms by which such social learning actually
takes place. They construct an ACE framework for the analysis of articial stock markets
that includes an additional social learning mechanism, referred to as a school. Roughly,
the school consists of a group of agents (e.g., business school faculty members) who
are competing with each other to supply publicly the best possible models for the
forecasting of stock returns. The success (tness) of school members is measured
by the current forecasting accuracy of their models, whereas the success of traders is
measured in terms of their wealth. Each trader continually chooses between trading in
the market and taking time off to attend the school and test a sample of the forecasting
models currently proposed by school members in an attempt to discover a model that is
superior to the one he is currently using. The school members and the traders coevolve
over time in an intricate feedback loop. To test the implications of their stock market
model, Chen and Yeh conduct an experiment consisting of 14,000 successive trading
periods. One key nding is that market behavior never settles down; initially successful
forecasting models quickly become obsolete as they are adopted by increasing numbers
of agents. Another key nding is that individual traders do not act as if they believe
in the efcient market hypothesis even though aggregate market statistics suggest that
the stock market is efcient.
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As a nal example, Howitt and Clower [44] use an ACE model of a decentralized
market economy to study the potential emergence of a generally accepted medium of
exchange (i.e., money). The authors are particularly interested in the possible role of
“trade specialists” in supporting the emergence of money. A trade specialist is a trader
who can reduce the costs of search, bargaining, and exchange by setting up a trading
facility that enables nonspecialist traders to come together to trade on a regular basis.
The authors use a stylized model of a decentralized market economy in which customers
use simple behavioral rules to determine their economic activities and customers can
only trade with each other through the intermediation of specialist trading facilities,
called shops. Starting from an initial situation in which no institutions that support
economic exchange exist, the authors nd that a “fully developed” market economy
emerges in just over 90% of all runs, in the sense that almost all agents are either in
a protable trade relationship or they own a shop. Moreover, over 99% of these fully
developed runs exhibit a unique money, in the sense that one commodity and only
one commodity is being used as a money to facilitate trades.
2.3.3 Restructured Electricity Markets
To date, most auction research has focused on one-sided auctions with a xed number
of agents who bid competitively for single units of an item in a single trading period.
In reality, however, many auctions involve small numbers of buyers and sellers, asym-
metric in size, who meet repeatedly and frequently and who determine their price and
quantity offers strategically in an effort to exploit market power opportunities [50, 51].
As a case in point, auctions being designed for restructured wholesale electricity
markets typically involve price and quantity offers for the sale of large amounts of bulk
electricity by small numbers of electricity generators, some of whom have relatively
large market shares.8 The resulting market processes are extremely complex, rendering
difcult the application of traditional analytical and statistical tools. Consequently,
researchers are beginning to explore the possible use of agent-based computational
frameworks. Some of this work is outlined below.
Bower and Bunn [17] use an ACE framework to study the following issue for the
England and Wales wholesale electricity market: How would prices for bulk electricity
be affected by the government-proposed change from a uniform-price auction, in
which a single unit price is set for all units sold, to a discriminatory-price auction,
in which a distinct unit price is set for each matched seller and buyer as a function
of their bid and ask prices? The market is modeled as a sequential game among
electricity generators (sellers) with market share and prot objectives. In each trading
period each generator submits to the auction a supply function expressing its price
and quantity offers. Each individual power plant for each generator is represented as a
separate autonomous adaptive agent capable of evolving its supply strategy by means
of a simple reinforcement learning algorithm. In contrast, agents on the demand side of
the market are assumed to be passive price takers; their buying behavior is modeled by a
xed aggregate demand curve reecting a standardized daily load prole corresponding
to a typical winter day.
A key experimental nding of the authors is that, when supply function offers are
not publicly available, the proposed change from a uniform-price to a discriminatory-
price auction design permits larger generators to increase their prots relative to smaller
generators. Larger generators have a signicant informational advantage over smaller
generators under the discriminatory auction because they submit more offers and there-
fore can learn more precisely about the current state of the market. The uniform-price
8 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/epres.htm for an extensive collection of resources related to restructured electricity
markets.
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auction mitigates this advantage by letting smaller generators share in the industry’s
collective learning by receiving the same market price for their electricity as any other
generator. The authors conclude that, under certain circumstances, the choice of the
auction design may actually be less important than simply ensuring that all auction
participants have equal access to information, regardless of their size.
Bunn and Oliveira [18] construct an ACE model of a wholesale electricity market to
explore the possible effects of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) intro-
duced in the United Kingdom in March 2001. Their model incorporates the following
critical features of the NETA market design: strategically interacting market participants
(electricity generators and energy purchasers for end-use customers); a system opera-
tor; interactions between a bilateral market, a balancing mechanism, and a settlement
process; determination of day-ahead mark-ups on previous-day price offers by means
of reinforcement learning; and daily dynamic constraints. The authors apply this NETA
computational model to the full electricity system of England and Wales as it existed
in summer 2000. They then use their experimental ndings to provide insights about
possible market equilibria under NETA as a function of both market structure and agent
characteristics.
Nicolaisen et al. [69] construct an ACE model of a restructured wholesale electric-
ity market in which prices are set by means of a discriminatory-price double auction,
that is, an auction in which the sellers (generators) and the buyers (electricity pur-
chasers for end-use customers) both actively make price offers. These price offers are
determined adaptively in each successive auction round by means of a reinforcement
learning algorithm developed on the basis of human-subject experimental data. The
authors investigate three different specications for the learning parameters. For each
specication, they study the effects of differing capacity and concentration conditions
on market power (distribution of prots) and market efciency (total prots). Their
ndings show that the attempts by sellers and buyers to exercise strategic market power
are largely ineffective; opportunistic ask and bid price offers offset each other due to
the symmetry of the double auction design. On the other hand, the relative market
power of sellers and buyers is well predicted by structural market power, that is, by
the market power outcomes implied by structural market conditions under the assumed
absence of opportunistic ask and bidding behavior. In addition, high market efciency
is generally attained. As a cautionary note, however, the authors also show that other
forms of learning (e.g., social mimicry learning via genetic algorithms) can result in
seriously degraded market efciency.
2.4 Formation of Economic Networks
An important aspect of imperfectly competitive markets with strategically interacting
agents is the manner in which agents determine their transaction partners, which affects
the form of the transaction networks that evolve and persist over time.9 Transaction
networks are now frequently analyzed by means of transaction cost economics [109].
To date, however, this literature has not stressed the dynamics of learning, adaptation,
and innovation, nor the development of trust. Instead, it is assumed that optimal forms
of organization or governance will arise that are suited to the particular characteristics
of agent transactions, such as the need for transaction-specic investments.
One particular type of transaction network that is attracting increased attention from
economists on the basis of its potential optimality properties is a small-world network
[105]. A small-world network is a connected network with two properties: (a) each
node is linked to a relatively well-connected set of neighbor nodes; and (b) the presence
9 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/netgroup.htm for pointers to individual researchers and research groups who are currently
studying economic and social network formation.
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of shortcut connections between some nodes makes the average minimum path length
between nodes small. Such networks have both local connectivity and global reach.
Wilhite [108] uses an ACE model of a bilateral exchange economy to explore the
consequences of restricting trade to small-world trade networks. He focuses on the
trade-off between market efciency and transaction costs under four types of trade
networks: (a) completely connected trade networks (every trader can trade with ev-
ery other trader); (b) locally disconnected trade networks consisting of disjoint trade
groups; (c) locally connected trade networks consisting of trade groups aligned around
a ring with a one-trader overlap at each meeting point; and (d) small-world trade net-
works constructed from the locally connected trade networks by permitting from one
to ve randomly specied shortcut trade links between members of non-neighboring
trade groups. Given each type of trade network, traders endowed with stocks of two
goods seek out feasible partners, negotiate prices, and then trade with those who of-
fer the best deals. A key nding is that small-world trade networks provide most of
the market-efciency advantages of the completely connected trade networks while
retaining almost all of the transaction cost economies of the locally connected trade
networks. His ndings also suggest that there exist microlevel incentives for the for-
mation of small-world trade networks, since the traders who use this type of network
tend to do well relative to the traders who do not.
A natural extension of Wilhite’s work with xed trade networks is to consider how
networks among trade partners initially form and subsequently evolve. Early ACE
studies focusing on the endogenous formation of trade networks include Albin and
Foley [1], Kirman [48], Tesfatsion [93, 94], Vriend [102], and Weisbuch et al. [106]. In
each of these studies, a key concern is the emergence of a trade network among a
collection of buyers and sellers who determine their trade partners adaptively, on the
basis of past experiences with these partners.
More recent ACE research on the endogenous formation of trade networks has
tended to focus on specic types of markets. Tesfatsion [95, 96] focuses on labor
markets. An ACE labor market framework is used to study the relationship between
market structure, worker–employer interaction networks, worksite behaviors, and wel-
fare outcomes. Workers and employers repeatedly participate in costly searches for
preferred worksite partners on the basis of continually updated expected utility, en-
gage in worksite interactions modeled as prisoner’s dilemma games, and evolve their
worksite strategies over time on the basis of the earnings secured by these strategies in
past worksite interactions. Any dissatised worker can quit working for an employer
by directing his future work offers elsewhere, and any dissatised employer can re a
worker by refusing to accept future work offers from this worker.
Specially constructed descriptive statistics are used to study experimentally deter-
mined correlations between market structure and worker–employer network forma-
tions, and between network formations and the types of labor market outcomes that
these networks support. Two aspects of market structure are studied as treatment fac-
tors: job concentration (number of workers to number of employers); and job capacity
(total potential job openings to total potential work offers). One key nding is that,
holding job capacity xed, changes in job concentration have only small and unsystem-
atic effects on attained market power levels. A second key nding is that interaction
effects are strong. For each setting of the treatment factors, the resulting network dis-
tribution exhibits two or three sharp isolated peaks corresponding to distinct types of
worker–employer interaction networks, each of which supports a distinct pattern of
worksite behaviors and welfare outcomes.
Tassier and Menczer [89] focus on an interesting puzzle regarding the prominent role
of job referral networks in U.S. labor markets. The authors note that a robust nding
for U.S. labor markets is that approximately 50% of workers at any given time have
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obtained their jobs through referral-based hiring. For referral-based hiring to be this
effective, the referral networks must be efciently transferring job information between
employers and potential workers. On the other hand, most job referrals in the U.S.
labor market come from friends, relatives, or other social contacts, not from contacts
chosen specically for job referral. Why, then, do these socially determined networks
also perform so well as referral networks?
Tassier and Menczer construct an ACE labor market model in which workers engage
in both direct job search and social network formation. Workers survive and reproduce
if they are able to acquire enough resources through wages (net of search and network
maintenance costs) to meet a survival requirement. The authors study the properties of
the social networks that evolve in order to establish the extent to which these networks
transfer job information efciently. Their model yields two main results. First, the
evolved social networks have small-world network properties, in the sense that they
are both very clustered (locally structured) and yet have global reach. These properties
enhance the ability of the social networks to perform as job referral networks. Second,
as evolution progresses, agents nevertheless ultimately expend more energy on direct
job search and network formation than is socially efcient. This loss in social efciency
corresponds to an increase in individual-agent survival time. More precisely, there is a
trade-off between the global efciency of the labor market and the local robustness of
the agents in terms of their ability to survive job losses.
Kirman and Vriend [49] construct an ACE model of the wholesale sh market in
Marseilles that captures in simplied form the structural aspects of the actual sh market.
Their objective is to understand two persistently observed features of the actual sh
market: price dispersion, and widespread buyer loyalty to sellers in the form of repeat
business. Each buyer and seller must make multiple decisions during each trading day
regarding price, quantity, choice of trading partner, and treatment of trading partner
(e.g., should a seller offer better deals to his more loyal buyers). Each of these decisions
is separately modeled for each individual agent using a version of Holland’s classier
system [41]. The authors report that, in experimental runs with their model, price
dispersion and loyalty emerge as a result of the coevolution of buyer and seller decision
rules. For example, regarding loyalty, buyers learn to become loyal as sellers learn to
offer a higher payoff to loyal buyers, while these sellers, in turn, learn to offer a higher
payoff to loyal buyers as they happen to realize a higher payoff from loyal buyers.
The authors provide a detailed discussion of the dynamic processes that underlie this
emergence of price dispersion and loyalty.
Klos and Nooteboom [52] use an ACE model to explore how transaction networks
develop among buyer and supplier rms who repeatedly choose and refuse their trans-
action partners on the basis of continually updated anticipations of future returns. These
anticipations depend in part on trust, where trust increases with the duration of a re-
lationship, and in part on protability. Buyer rms face a “buy or make” decision:
they can search for suppliers to obtain components for the production of differenti-
ated products to be sold in a nal goods market, or they can choose to produce these
components themselves. Supplier rms engage in both specic and general-purpose
asset investment tailored to the collection of buyer rms with whom they are transact-
ing. Buyer rms can increase revenues by selling more differentiated products, and
supplier rms can reduce input costs for buyer rms by generating learning-by-doing
efciencies for the buyer rms with whom they are in longer-term relationships.
The Klos and Nooteboom model permits an assessment of the efciency of resulting
prot outcomes as a function of trust and market conditions. The authors report illustra-
tive computational experiments with alternative settings for the degree of differentiation
among the buyers’ products. As predicted by transaction cost economics, more product
differentiation favors “make” relative to “buy” decisions due to higher switching costs
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and scale effects. Nevertheless, the path dependencies and uncertainties that arise for
rms due to the ability to make and break relationships on the basis of past experience
result in prot outcomes that are not always efcient.
Rouchier et al. [80] are motivated by a eld study focusing on seasonal mobility
(“transhumance”) among nomadic cattle herdsmen in North Cameroon. The eld study
explores the conditions that determine the access that nomadic herdsmen have to
pasture lands. A key nding is that the grazing patterns and individual relationships
established among herdsmen, village leaders, and village farmers tend to be very reg-
ular. In an attempt to better understand these observed regularities, Rouchier et al.
use an ACE framework to model the dynamics of the relationships among three agent
types: nomadic herdsmen who need both water and grass for their cattle and who
seek access to these resources from village leaders and farmers in return for access
fees; village leaders who provide herdsmen with either good or poor access to water
depending on their order of arrival; and village farmers who own pasture land that they
may or may not permit the herdsmen to use for cattle grazing. Herd sizes evolve as a
function of the agreements that are reached.
Rouchier et al. test two different models of reasoning for their agents: a “cost priority”
model based on ideas from transaction cost economics [109] under which agents care
only about minimizing their costs; and a “friend priority” model based on ideas from
institutional theory [70] under which agents also care directly about the stability of their
relationships. Experiments are conducted in which the land in some villages randomly
becomes unavailable for use as pasture for short periods of time, so that the farmers
in these villages refuse all access requests from herdsmen during these periods. The
authors show that the cost-priority and friend-priority models of agent reasoning result
in dramatically different experimental outcomes. In particular, the global efciency of
the cost-priority model is surprisingly low relative to the friend-priority model, leading
in some cases to the disappearance of herds. In explanation, the authors note that
the cost-priority model tends to result in less-exible agent behavior, and this in turn
results in less robustness to land disruption shocks and more overgrazing of pasture
lands. In reality, nomadic herdsmen are careful to sustain an extended social network
of friends across a wide variety of villages through repeated interactions, and only the
friend-priority model produced such a pattern.
A different kind of network problem is posed by information transmission over
time. An information cascade is said to occur when agents ignore their own private
information and simply imitate the selections of the agents who selected before them.
Two well-known examples of information cascades within economics are bank panics
and stock market crashes. Observing that others are withdrawing their funds from some
nancial institution (e.g., a bank or a stock market), agents might lose condence in
the institution and run to withdraw their own funds.
De Vany and Lee [26] construct an ACE framework within which they explore the
existence and fragility of information cascades under a variety of alternative structural
specications. Their framework differs from standard information cascade models in
two basic respects. First, each decision can involve a selection from among more than
two options. Second, agents can receive local quality signals from neighboring agents
in addition to global quantity information about the proportion of agents who have
selected each option to date. For concreteness, De Vany and Lee apply their model to
the study of the dynamics of motion picture box ofce revenues. The authors’ main
nding is that multiple cascades can coexist in an intermittent pattern in which two
or more intertwined cascades are observed to alternate repeatedly over time as the
dominant cascade pattern. This intermittence makes it difcult to isolate individual
cascades and to predict which if any of the competing cascades will ultimately win out.
The authors argue that the complex dynamical patterns observed in their computational
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experiments resemble the irregular dynamics observed in actual time-series data for
motion picture box ofce revenues.
2.5 Modeling of Organizations
Within economics, a group of people is considered to constitute an organization if the
group has an objective or performance criterion that transcends the objectives of the
individuals within the group [101]. The computational modeling of organizations began
at least as far back as the 1950s, when Nobel laureate Herbert Simon rst encountered
computers at the RAND Corporation capable of imitating intelligence symbolically, not
just numerically [85, Chap. 13]. As detailed in Prietula et al. [75], however, progress
was slow until the recent development of object-oriented programming (OOP). OOP
is particularly “organization friendly” since explicit use of analogies to organizational
phenomena have been used in the design of various OOP languages, such as Smalltalk.
The studies collected together in [75] view organizations as complex adaptive sys-
tems, and most make use of OOP. A broad range of organizational issues is addressed,
including rm organization. This work, led by the efforts of Kathleen Carley’s group
at Carnegie Mellon University, has been a driving force in the recent surge of in-
terest among social scientists in agent-based computational modeling in general and
computational organization theory in particular. Although few economists are directly
involved in this work at present, this could change in the near future. For example,
Van Zandt [101, Sect. 4.1] explicitly calls for more attention to be paid to agent-based
computational modeling in his survey of economic organization theory. Consequently,
modeling of organizations is primarily included here as a potentially fruitful research
area for future ACE work.
As seen in [75], agent-based computational studies of rms in organization theory
have tended to stress the effects of a rm’s organizational structure on its own resulting
behavior. In contrast, as seen in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4, ACE market studies have
tended to stress the effects of particular types of rm behavioral rules on price dynamics,
growth, and market structure. Dawid et al. [24] strike out in an interesting new direction
by combining these two perspectives. They use a stylized ACE market model to explore
how the structure of the market and the internal organization of each participant rm
affect the form of the optimal behavioral rules for the participant rms.
Specically, Dawid et al. consider a collection of rms participating in an industry
(i.e., a market for a closely related collection of goods, such as soft drinks). At the
beginning of every time period, each rm chooses whether to produce an existing
product variety or to introduce a new product variety. The demand for each product
variety dies out after a stochastically determined amount of time, hence each rm
must engage in some degree of innovation to sustain its protability. Firms differ
in their ability to imitate existing product varieties and in their ability to design new
product varieties due to random effects and to “learning by doing” effects that alter the
organizational structure of each rm. Each rm has an innovation rule determining its
choice to innovate or not, and the rms coevolve these rules over time on the basis of
anticipated protability. The authors conduct systematic experiments to explore how,
for optimal protability, the innovation rule of a rm should adapt both to the structure
of the industry as a whole and to the organizational structure of the individual rms of
which it is comprised.
2.6 Design of Computational Agents for Automated Markets
In addition to saving labor time, automated contracting through computational agents
can increase search efciency in certain problem applications. For example, computa-
tional agents are often more effective at nding benecial contractual arrangements in
market contexts, which tend to be strategically complex multi-agent settings with large
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strategy domains. Consequently, a large number of researchers are now involved in
the design of computational agents for automated markets. To date, much of this work
has focused on important but nitty-gritty implementation, enforcement, and security
issues.
For example, the contracts used in automated markets have generally been bind-
ing contracts that limit the ability of the computational agents to react to unforeseen
events. Recently the concept of a “leveled commitment contract” has been proposed
that permits agents to decommit from contracts by paying a monetary penalty to the
contracting partner, but the efciency of the resulting contracts depends heavily on the
structuring of the penalties. Andersson and Sandholm [2] use an ACE model of an auto-
mated negotiation system to study experimentally the sensitivity of leveled commitment
contractual outcomes to changes in penalty structurings and to changes in the design
of the computational agent negotiators. Four types of penalties are considered: xed,
percentage of contract price, increasing based on contract start date, and increasing
based on contract breach date. Agents differ by amount of look-ahead and by degree
of self-interested behavior. Multiple task-allocation problem instances are tested, with
ve negotiation rounds permitted for each instance. In all tested settings, the authors
nd that choosing relatively low but positive decommitment penalties works best. Sur-
prisingly, however, the authors also nd that self-interested myopic agents achieve a
higher social welfare level, and more rapidly, than cooperative myopic agents when
decommitment penalties are low. Although a look-ahead capability improves agent
performance, over short ranges of penalty parameters myopic agents perform almost
as well.
In a provocative article, Kephart [47] attempts to clarify the broader implications of
this ongoing work on automated markets. He argues that the higher search efciency
of computational agents in automated markets means that humans are on the verge of
losing their status as the sole economic species on the planet. As evidence that this
trend is already well under way, he points to the growing use of computational agents
in automated auction markets on the Internet. To illustrate the higher efciency of
computational agents in the latter setting, he reports ndings for auction experiments
in which human bidders pitted against computational bidding agents are consistently
outperformed. He concludes with the prediction that the information economy will
become the largest multi-agent economic system ever envisioned, comprising billions
of adaptive strategically interacting computational agents.
2.7 Parallel Experiments with Real and Computational Agents
Human-subject experimentation has become an important economic research tool [79].
One problem with human-subject experimentation, however, is that it is never possible
to know exactly why a human subject is making a particular choice. Rather, the human
subject’s beliefs and preferences must be inferred from his choices. In contrast, in ACE
experiments with computational agents, the modeler sets the initial conditions of the
experiment. As the computational agents then coevolve their behavioral rules over
time, the modeler can attempt to trace this evolution back to its root causes. A possible
difculty, however, is the realism of the evolutionary learning process.
This suggests a possible synergetic role for parallel human-subject and computational-
agent experiments. Human-subject behavior can be used to guide the specication of
learning processes for computational agents. Conversely, computational-agent behav-
ior can be used to formulate hypotheses about the root causes of observed human-
subject behaviors. Within economics, the earliest use of parallel experimentation ap-
pears to have been the pioneering study by Miller and Andreoni [68]. Other early
studies include Andreoni and Miller [3], Arifovic [4, 5], Arthur [7], and Chan et al. [19].
Two recent examples are outlined below for illustration.
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Building on an earlier study by Marimon et al. [62], Duffy [28] uses parallel exper-
iments with human subjects and computational agents to examine the possible emer-
gence of a generally accepted medium of exchange (i.e., money). Parallel experiments
are conducted using similar versions of a search model of money. Type i agents desire
to consume good i but produce good i C 1. In each period, agents are randomly paired
and must decide whether to exchange goods. An agent can accept a good in trade
either because it is directly desired as consumption or because the agent plans to store
the good for use in later trades. Goods have different storage costs. The key issue is
whether the agents will converge on the use of some particular good as money that they
are willing to accept in trades even though it has no direct consumption value. The be-
havioral rules used by the computational agents to conduct their trades are modeled on
the basis of evidence obtained from the human-subject experiments. The computational
agents adaptively select among their feasible behavioral rules by means of a simple form
of reinforcement learning. Duffy reports that the ndings for the computational-agent
experiments match basic features of the ndings for the human-subject experiments.
Duffy then uses the ndings from the computational-agent experiments to predict
what might happen in two modied versions of the search model of money that are
designed to encourage greater speculative behavior by certain player types. Specula-
tive behavior occurs when an agent accepts a good in trade that is costlier to store
than a good he is already storing because his expectation is that the higher-cost good
will prove to be more generally acceptable to other agents in future trades. Based on
theoretical considerations, Duffy’s key prediction for each of the modied versions of
the model is that the speed with which the players learn to adopt speculative strate-
gies will increase, which in turn will increase the likelihood of convergence to the
speculative equilibrium. Actual experiments are then run for the two modied ver-
sions of the model using human subjects, with encouraging results: the ndings from
the experiments with human subjects are roughly similar to those predicted by the
computational-agent experiments.
Pingle and Tesfatsion [74] conduct parallel experiments with human subjects and
computational agents for a labor market with incomplete labor contracts. A distinctive
feature of this experimental employment study relative to previous theoretical stud-
ies is that matches between workers and employers are determined endogenously on
the basis of past worksite experiences rather than randomly in accordance with some
exogenously specied probability distribution. In each time period, workers either
direct work offers to preferred employers or choose unemployment and receive the
nonemployment payoff, and employers either accept work offers from preferred work-
ers (subject to capacity limitations) or remain vacant and receive the nonemployment
payoff. Matched workers and employers participate in a risky employment relationship
modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma game. Both the computational agents and the human
subjects evolve their partner preferences and worksite behaviors over time on the basis
of past matching and worksite experiences.
In both types of experiments, increases in the nonemployment payoff result in higher
average unemployment and vacancy rates while at the same time encouraging coop-
eration among the workers and employers who do form matches. On the other hand,
given a high nonemployment payoff, an increasing number of the computational work-
ers and employers learn over time to coordinate on mutual cooperation and avoid
coordination failure, so that overall efciency increases as well. This potentially impor-
tant “longer run” policy effect is not clearly evident in the necessarily shorter trials run
with human subjects. This difference raises challenging issues both for human-subject
experimentalists wishing to conduct social policy impact studies and for computational
experimentalists who wish to use human-subject experiments to validate their compu-
tational ndings.
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2.8 Building ACE Computational Laboratories
Many economists have advocated the systematic use of computational models for the
testing of economic theories. For example, Nobel laureate Robert Lucas [59] writes:
“[A theory] is not a collection of assertions about the behavior of the actual economy
but rather an explicit set of instructions for building a parallel or analog system—a
mechanical, imitation economy. [Our] task as I see it [is] to write a FORTRAN program
that will accept specic economic policy rules as ‘input’ and will generate as ‘output’
statistics describing the operating characteristics of time series we care about, which
are predicted to result from these policies” (pp. 272, 288). Taking advantage of the
recent advent of more powerful computational tools, Lane [55] explicitly advocates the
use of agent-based computational models. Specically, he asks the reader to “imag-
ine an Articial Economy as an experimental environment in which users can easily
tailor models designed to suit their own particular research agendas. Object-oriented
programming techniques can be used to construct such an environment, which would
consist of a library of different kinds of modeled institutions and agent types, together
with an interface that makes it easy for users to combine different items from this library
to make particular economic experiments” (p. 106).
A current drawback of agent-based computational modeling for many economists,
however, is the perceived need for strong programming skills. Easily learned languages
such as Starlogo are not powerful enough for many economic applications. General
programming languages such as C++ and Java and authoring tools such as AgentSheets,
Ascape, RePast, and Swarm provide useful repositories of software for constructing
agent-based model economies, but their main appeal is to experienced programmers.
A computational laboratory (CL) provides a potentially useful middle way to avoid
these difculties. A CL is a computational framework that permits the study of systems
of multiple interacting agents by means of controlled and replicable experiments [27].
CLs with a clear and easily manipulated graphical user interface can permit researchers
to engage in serious computational research even if they have only modest program-
ming skills. In particular, researchers can use a CL to test the sensitivity of a system
to changes in a wide variety of key parameters without the need to do any original
programming. On the other hand, a CL can be designed to be both modular and
extensible. Thus, as users gain more experience and condence, they can begin to
experiment with alternative module implementations to broaden the range of system
applications encompassed by the CL.10
For example, McFadzean et al. [65] have developed a CL designed specically for
the study of trade network formation in a variety of market contexts. This CL, referred
to as the Trade Network Game (TNG) Lab, comprises buyers, sellers, and dealers who
repeatedly search for preferred trade partners, engage in risky trades modeled as non-
cooperative games, and evolve their trade strategies over time. The evolution of trade
networks is visualized dynamically by means of real-time animations and real-time per-
formance chart displays. The authors explain the architecture of the TNG Lab and
demonstrate its capabilities and usefulness by means of illustrative labor market experi-
ments. The primary objective of the authors, however, is to use the example of the TNG
Lab to encourage the routine construction and use of CLs for social science applications.
3 Open Issues and Future Research Directions
A key open issue for ACE research area (a)—learning and the embodied mind—is
how to model the minds of the computational agents who populate ACE frameworks.
10 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/acecode.htm for pointers to a wide variety of CLs, authoring tools, and general program-
ming languages that are currently being used to design and/or test multi-agent systems.
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Should these minds be viewed as logic machines with appended data ling cabinets,
the traditional articial intelligence viewpoint [35]? Or should they instead be viewed as
controllers for embodied activity, as advocated by evolutionary psychologists [22]? If the
focus of an ACE study is the design of a fully automated market, there is no particular
reason why the minds of the computational agents should have to mimic those of real
people—indeed, this could be positively detrimental to good market performance. On
the other hand, if the focus is on the modeling of some real-world economic process,
then mimicry might be essential to ensure predictive content.
An interesting related issue is the extent to which the learning processes of real-
world market participants are maladapted to market institutions, leaving room for im-
provement from the application of optimization tools. Conversely, to what extent have
existing market protocols evolved or been designed to avoid the need for any great ra-
tionality on the part of market participants? The former issue is considered by Kephart
[47] and the latter issue is considered by Gode and Sunder [39] and Nicolaisen et al. [69].
Also, with what degree of exibility should agent learning in ACE frameworks be
specied? Many ACE studies tend to rely on learning algorithms in the form of relatively
simple updating equations with xed parameterizations. The evidence accumulated for
these algorithms strongly suggests that no one algorithm performs best in all situations,
nor does any one algorithm match best to observed human decision-making behavior
under all conditions. A better way to proceed, then, might be to permit the agents in
ACE frameworks to learn to learn. For example, each agent could be permitted to evolve
a repertoire of behavioral rules or modes that the agent selectively activates depending
on the situation at hand. Examples of such learning-to-learn representations include
classier systems [41], the “adaptive toolbox” approach advocated by Gigerenzer and
Selten [36], and the evolvable neural network approach developed by Menczer and
Below [66]. In addition, as stressed by Marks [64], it might be desirable to permit agents
to evolve their information-processing capabilities along with their rule sets.
Parallel concerns arise regarding the modeling of learning in ALife frameworks. For
example, Bedau et al. [15] pose, among others, the following three open problems for
ALife researchers (p. 365):
7. Determine minimal conditions for evolutionary transitions from specic to
generic response systems.
10. Develop a theory of information processing, information ow, and
information generation for evolving systems.
11. Demonstrate the emergence of intelligence and mind in an articial living
system.
Point 7 refers to the acquisition of sensing and responding capabilities at a basic biolog-
ical level, for example, the development of mechanisms of defense against molecular
invasion. The learning-to-learn issues addressed by points 10 and 11 more closely par-
allel those presented above for ACE research. For example, Bedau et al. note that point
11 requires a consideration of the connection between life and mind, and whether it
is more productive to study mind as embodied cognition or as a device for logical
information processing.
Finally, what about the connection between individual-agent learning and the evolu-
tion of agent populations through the birth and death process? Some ACE researchers
have made initial steps toward addressing this issue by examining individual-agent
learning in the context of an “overlapping generations” economy in which successive
generations of agents are born, have children, and die [5, 82]. On the whole, how-
ever, most ACE studies to date have assumed that agents are innitely lived learners.
In contrast, ALife researchers have devoted considerable attention to learning agents
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in evolving populations, although their focus has primarily been on biological rather
than cultural evolution [16]. A question that has particularly vexed ALife researchers is
individual plasticity, that is, the range of variability that individual agents are capable
of expressing during their lifetimes in response to environmental variations, and the
extent to which this plasticity is subject to evolutionary pressures.
An important issue for ACE research area (b)—the evolution of behavioral norms—
is how mutual cooperation manages to evolve among economic agents even when
cheating reaps immediate gains and binding commitments are not possible. What
roles do reputation, trust, reciprocity, retaliation, spitefulness, and punishment play?
More generally, how do exchange customs and other behavioral norms important for
economic processes come to be established, and how stable are these norms over time?
Are these behavioral norms diffusing across traditional political and cultural boundaries,
resulting in an increasingly homogeneous global economy?
As detailed in Gintis [37], the evolution of behavioral norms has also been studied
using classic game theory. In the latter, the approach has been to explain this evolution
on the basis of individual rationality considerations, such as anticipations of future
reciprocity. In contrast, Gintis and many ACE researchers (e.g., Epstein [31]) have
tended to place equal or greater stress on peer emulation, parental mimicry, and other
socialization forces thought to underlie the transmission of culture. Socialization forces
are also emphasized in ALife studies of social organization, although much greater
emphasis is placed on understanding the possible connections of these forces with
biological evolution through genetic inheritance [15, Point 13].
A potentially fruitful area for future ACE research along these lines is the evolution
of behavioral norms in collective action situations, such as the collective usage of
common-pool resources. Many of the factors that can make these problems so difcult
for standard economic modeling—for example, face-to-face communication, trust, and
peer pressure—can easily be modeled within an ACE framework. Moreover, as seen in
[58, 72], an extensive body of evidence on collective decision making has been gathered
from human-subject experiments and eld studies that ACE researchers could use as
both guidance and validation for agent-based computational experiments.
An important issue driving ACE research area (c)—the bottom-up modeling of mar-
kets—is how to explain the evolution of markets and other market-related economic
institutions. Although many ACE researchers are now actively researching this issue,
much of this analysis focuses on the evolution of “horizontal” institutional structures,
for example, trade networks and monetary exchange systems. In contrast, real-world
economies are strongly hierarchical. Indeed, as pointed out by Simon [84, pp. 193–
230], hierarchies appear to be essential to help individuals sort information in a complex
world. Can an ACE approach be used to study the emergence of a hierarchically ordered
economic system from an economic world with an initially horizontal structure?
A similar issue arises for ALife in trying to model the emergence of hierarchical
organization for biological systems. Bedau et al. [15, p. 365] pose the following open
problem to ALife researchers:
8. Create a formal framework for synthesizing dynamical hierarchies at all scales.
Holland’s Echo framework [42] incorporates mechanisms intended to permit the emer-
gence of hierarchical structure in a model of an ecological system, but it appears that
much more still remains to be done [87]. Are there any valid analogies between social
hierarchy and biological hierarchy that might productively be exploited to help ACE
and ALife researchers understand and model the emergence of hierarchical structures?
The primary issue driving ACE research area (d)—the formation of economic net-
works—is the manner in which economic interaction networks are determined through
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deliberative choice of partners as well as by chance. Moreover, an interaction might
consist of some kind of game situation in which the interacting partners have to choose
actions strategically. Consequently, the payoff that will result from any given choice
of partner might not be knowable in advance. This results in a highly complicated
feedback process in which current partner choices are inuenced by past action choices
and current action choices are inuenced by past partner choices. In contrast, in ALife
studies, attention is typically focused on biological agents (e.g., ants, cells, plants)
whose interaction patterns are assumed to be determined by a combination of random
events, genetic features, and neighborhood topology rather than deliberative choice.
Moreover, the payoffs associated with any particular interaction are often assumed to
be known in advance.
Another important issue driving ACE research area (d) is the extent to which in-
teraction networks are important for predicting market outcomes [77]. If interaction
effects are weak, as in some types of auction markets [39, 69], then the structural as-
pects of the market (e.g., numbers of buyers and sellers, costs, capacities) will be the
primary determinants of market outcomes. In this case, each different market struc-
ture should map into a relatively simple central-tendency output distribution that can
easily be recovered by observing empirically or experimentally determined market out-
comes in response to varying structural conditions. If interaction effects are strong, as
in labor markets [96], then each different market structure might map into a spectral
distribution of possible market outcomes with outcomes clustered around two or more
distinct “attractors” corresponding to distinct possible interaction networks. Moreover,
strong interaction effects might also affect the speed of convergence to these attrac-
tors, increasing this speed in the case of highly connected networks and impeding or
inhibiting convergence if networks are sparsely connected or disconnected.
The main questions traditionally driving research area (e)—the modeling of organi-
zations—have largely been normative. What is the optimal form of organization for
achieving an organization’s goals? More generally, what is the relationship between
environmental properties, organizational structure, and organizational performance? As
illustrated by Dawid et al. [24], the increased use of ACE modeling in this research area
might ultimately permit a signicant widening of this traditional scope by permitting
the quantitative study of organizations within broader economic settings, for example,
the study of intrarm organization for multiple rms participating within a market. A
corresponding analogy for ALife might be the study of organ development for multiple
organs coexisting within the context of a body.
ACE research area (f)—the design of computational agents for automated markets—
has largely been driven by the quest for optimal agent designs in specic problem
contexts. Nevertheless, Kephart [47] takes a broader tack, focusing instead on the
increasing ubiquity of articial life forms that this trend toward automation entails. This
trend raises concerns for ACE researchers just as it does for ALife researchers. Bedau
et al. [15, p. 365] highlight two open problems in this regard:
12. Evaluate the inuence of machines on the next major evolutionary transition
of life.
14. Establish ethical principles for articial life.
A number of challenging issues remain unresolved for ACE research area (g)—
parallel experiments with real and computational agents. Chief among these is the need
to make the parallel experiments truly parallel, so that comparisons are meaningful and
lead to robust insights. One major hurdle is the need to ensure that the salient aspects
of an experimental design as perceived by human participants are captured in the
initial conditions specied for the computational agents. Experience suggests this can
be difcult to achieve, because the perceptions of human participants regarding the
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design and purpose of an experiment can differ systematically from the perceptions of
the investigator [79].
Another major hurdle is that experiments run with human participants generally have
to be kept short to prevent boredom among the participants and to keep within the
budgetary constraints of the investigators.11 This means that the “shadow of the past”
might be strongly affecting experimental outcomes for individual human participants
in ways not understood and controlled for by investigators. For example, participants
might come to an experiment with idiosyncratic preconceptions regarding the reliability
and generosity of strangers. In contrast, experiments with computational agents can be
run for many generations to diminish dependence on initial conditions. An important
question, then, is which type of horizon, short run or long run, provides the best
approximation for real-world economic processes. Do real-world economic agents
essentially move from one new economic situation to the next, never having a chance
to settle into long-run behavior? Or do these agents participate repeatedly in economic
situations with enough similarity that they are able to use long-run learned (or inherited)
behaviors to deal effectively with these situations?
The basic issue for ACE area (h)—building ACE computational laboratories—is the
need to construct CLs that permit the rigorous study of complex distributed multi-agent
systems through controlled experimentation. Should a separate CL be constructed
for each application, or should researchers strive for general multipurpose platforms?
How can experimental ndings be effectively communicated to other researchers by
means of descriptive statistics and graphical visualizations without information over-
load? How might these ndings be validated by comparisons with data obtained from
other sources?
A particularly important unresolved issue for area (h) is the need to ensure that
ndings from ACE experiments reect fundamental aspects of a considered application
problem and not simply the peculiarities of the particular hardware or software used to
implement the experiments. Clearly this issue is equally relevant for ALife researchers.
Using a portable cross-platform language such as Java helps to ensure independence
of the hardware platform, but not independence of specic software implementation
features. To address the latter issue, one possible approach is model docking, that is,
the alignment of different computational models to enable them to model the same ap-
plication problem [12]. Another possible approach is to have at least two independently
programmed versions of a computational model (e.g., a C++ and a Java version) and
to run cross-program replication experiments on different hardware platforms (e.g., a
personal computer and a UNIX workstation). This cross-platform replication would
require, for example, the encapsulation of pseudo-random number generators and the
saving of pseudo-random number seed values, good programming practice in any case.
Regardless of the approach taken, however, an essential prerequisite is that source code
be openly disseminated to other researchers for replication purposes.
A general question that has not yet been addressed is what constitutes the most
suitable scale of analysis for ACE modeling? Most of the illustrative ACE studies out-
lined in the previous section can be categorized as intranational economics, the study
of multi-agent economic processes that occur within the borders of a single country.
Indeed, many of these studies focus on single markets or small collections of markets,
the traditional purview of the eld of industrial organization. On the other hand, some
ACE researchers have undertaken ACE studies of open economies or international eco-
nomic systems [5, 45, 53, 76]. How useful will ACE modeling be for addressing issues at
11 Internet-enabled experiments could potentially lower the organizational costs associated with running human-subject experiments.
However, as detailed in [79], another contributing factor to the cost of running human-subject experiments is that participants
typically receive monetary payments proportional to their experimentally determined net pro t earnings to ensure their incentives
mimic the incentives they would face in corresponding real-world economic situations.
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this more macro level of analysis in comparison with other methodologies that are cur-
rently being developed for the same purpose, such as statistical mechanics approaches
[29, 30]?
A related question concerns the time horizons assumed in ACE modeling. The ACE
studies illustrated in Section 2 might be classied as intermediate-run studies, in that
they focus on evolutionary processes taking place over many time periods but not over
innitely many time periods. In contrast, authors such as Kandori et al. [46] and Young
[110] are interested in the probability with which different kinds of behavioral norms
and institutions emerge from the interactive decisions of adaptive individuals in the very
long run, as the number of time periods approaches innity. By focusing on the very
long run, these authors are able to bring to bear powerful analytical tools and concepts
(e.g., ergodicity) developed for the asymptotic study of stochastic processes. Due to
their constructive nature, ACE models cannot be used directly to conrm or reject the
long-run distributional predictions of these analytical studies. However, ACE models
could be used to examine the practical usefulness of these predictions by testing for
speeds of convergence.
Finally, what about the direction of causality between individuals and social group-
ings? Does ACE have anything to say about this ancient social science debate? For
anyone having actual hands-on experience constructing ACE models, it is difcult to
imagine how this debate could be viewed as anything but a total chimera. Within any
ACE model, the correct answer to the question “Which must come rst, individuals or
social groupings?” is “Neither.” As in the real world, individuals and social groupings
coevolve together in an intricate dance through time. Nevertheless, ACE researchers
are only just beginning to exploit the power of ACE frameworks to model this complex
two-way feedback process.
4 Summing Up the Potential Bene ts and Costs
Over the past 50 years a great divide has opened up between economic theorists and
other social scientists as economic theorists have increasingly resorted to mathematical
systems of equations to model economic processes. These systems now routinely
consist of stochastic nonlinear difference or differential equations, which many social
scientists nd either impenetrable or incredible as descriptions of social reality.
In contrast, the dening characteristic of ACE model economies is their construc-
tive grounding in the interactions of autonomous adaptive agents, broadly dened to
include economic, social, and environmental entities. ACE agents are necessarily con-
strained by the initial conditions set by the modeler. However, the dynamics of the
ensuing economic process are governed by agent–agent interactions, not by exoge-
nously imposed systems of equations, and the state of the economy at each point in
time is given by the internal attributes of the individual agents that currently popu-
late the economy. This type of dynamical description should have direct meaning for
economists and other social scientists, thus increasing the transparency and clarity of
the modeling process. Indeed, growing computational evidence suggests that simple
individual behaviors can generate complex macro regularities. To the extent this evi-
dence receives empirical support, even further improvements in clarity can be expected
from ACE modeling.
The use of ACE model economies could also facilitate the development and experi-
mental testing of integrated theories that build on theory and data from many different
elds of social science. In particular, ACE frameworks could encourage economists to
address growth, distribution, and welfare issues in a more comprehensive manner em-
bracing a variety of economic, social, political, and psychological factors, thus restoring
the broad vision of early political economists [86].
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Moreover, as seen in the work by Sargent [82], ACE model economies can be used
to test economic theories developed using more standard modeling approaches. Can
agents indeed learn to coordinate on the types of equilibria identied in these theories
and, if so, how? If there are multiple equilibria, which equilibrium (if any) will turn
out to be the dominant attractor, and why? ACE model economies can also be used
to test the robustness of these theories to relaxations of their standard assumptions,
such as common knowledge, rational expectations, and perfect capital markets. A key
question in this regard is the extent to which evolutionary forces might substitute for the
high degree of individual rationality assumed in standard economic theories. Finally,
ACE model economies can be used to test for observational equivalence, that is, for
the possibility that multiple distinct microstructures are capable of supporting a given
macro regularity.
To realize this potential, however, ACE researchers need to construct computational
laboratories that encompass issues of recognized importance to economists and other
social scientists. They need to use these computational laboratories to test clearly
articulated hypotheses by means of controlled and replicable experiments. They need
to report statistical summaries of their ndings that convey the import of these ndings
in a transparent and rigorous way. They need to increase condence in these statistical
summaries by systematic comparisons with data collected by other researchers using
other means. And they need to ensure that robust ndings cumulate over time, so that
each researcher’s work builds appropriately on the work that has gone before.
As documented in [107], similar requirements for success are perceived by ALife
researchers. It is certainly not easy for any one person to meet these requirements.
One possible answer would seem to be interdisciplinary collaboration. However, ex-
perience suggests that communication across disciplinary lines can be very difcult if
the individuals attempting the collaboration have little or no cross-disciplinary training.
Consequently, perhaps the most important task that those of us involved in ACE and
ALife research can undertake is to communicate to our students, along with our ex-
citement, the absolute importance of acquiring basic computational and statistical skills
together with suitable training in the desired application domains.
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